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1. Introduction
While the debate about the shape of Reduced Emission from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD) policy at international level has been developing steadily 
in the three years since the concept was first introduced (Miles and Kapos, 2008: 
1454-1455; Gullison et al., 2007: 985-986), much less consideration has been 
given to how REDD will be governed and administered at the national level once 
this policy has been adopted.   In international discussions on REDD there has been 
a strong, if not very explicit, agreement that how a country implements REDD is a 
matter of national sovereignty, and that this should not be the concern of international 
bodies.  This follows the precedent of the definition and implementation of ‘sustainable 
development’ in connection with CDM.  There is a formal requirement that all CDM 
projects should produce sustainable development benefits as well as carbon benefits, 
but the assessment of that and the approval procedure is left to the host country.
In discussions on REDD, the only concern of this nature that has been voiced up to 
now relates to the rights of indigenous peoples and other forest dwellers whose rights 
could potentially be threatened by moves to bring forest under formal protection 
and management for carbon (mentioned in Decision 2/CP13, in the introductory 
remarks). This is undoubtedly a serious issue, since groups which have no formal 
tenure to the forest land that has customarily been the source of at least part of their 
livelihood base, may indeed be very vulnerable to policies which will formalize and 
monetize forest carbon, unless safeguards are put in place.  However, this is by no 
means the only issue of importance.  There are a number of other crucial aspects of 
governance which need to be addressed.
This policy note starts from the assumption that the state will be the recipient of 
the financial rewards of any carbon credits issued under REDD, whether from a 
fund or a market mechanism, as this reflects the view of the majority of the Parties. 
Emission reductions will be realized at multiple locations within each country, through 
various mechanisms (forest policies, improved forest management, limitations on 
forest conversion, etc.), and involve many different stakeholders and organizations. 
Consequently, there will have to be some (direct or indirect) distribution of the 
compensation received at national level to different actors,  regardless of whether at 
international level REDD is built on a market basis or on a fund.  Although there have 
been some examples of national payment for carbon services programmes (Costa 
Rica, Mexico for example), these have been experimental and on a relatively small 
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scale; there is no clear model for how such distribution of rewards could be organized 
more generally.  REDD will operate country-wide and under many different national 
circumstances, and many challenges may be encountered in designing governance 
systems which both provide sufficient incentives and are considered by stakeholders 
to be equitable.  Without these characteristics they are unlikely to succeed.  It is also 
clear that the nature of these characteristics will vary across countries. 
This policy note highlights a number of key social and governance issues that need 
to be considered in the debate on REDD.   We use the cases of Nepal and India to 
illustrate and provide examples.
2. Types of programmes that countries may promote under REDD
Under the principle of sovereignty, the strategies adopted by individual countries to 
achieve REDD goals will not be determined internationally but locally.  The UNFCCC 
will simply determine the methodologies to be used in accounting carbon savings. 
At national level, a range of programmes is clearly possible, as evidenced by 
proposals made in submissions by around 25 countries to the World Bank’s Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility.  Figure 1 illustrates how a country might typically build 
up its emission reductions by using a variety of approaches, such as Payments for 
Environmental Services, Reduced Impact Logging, enforcement of existing forest law 
in reserves and conservation areas, and expansion of community forest management. 
It is evident from the range of possible contributing activities that many different actors 
are likely to be involved, which means that the governance system has to be broad 
enough to cater for all their different situations.
For the case of Nepal and India, it is probable that a bundle of activities would 
be envisaged to contribute to the overall REDD programme.  Both countries have 
been very active and successful in promoting community participation in forest 
management through Community Forest Management (CFM) agreements and Joint 
Forest Management (JFM) in India.  In Nepal’s case, 25% (1.1 m ha) of the forest 
estate is now managed by over 14,000 community forestry user groups (CFUGs), 
in which one third of the entire population of the country is involved (Kanel, 2004). 
In India, 16% (17 m ha) of the countries forest is under JFM run by 84000 JFM 
committees. In India, laws regarding village forests are based on state legislature. In 
the state of Uttarakhand, there are 6,069 Van Panchayats (VPs) managing 405,426 
ha of forest which is 13.63% of the total forest area in the state.    
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(d) Different levels of government/administration will all have overheads related to 
REDD, and all will therefore have some claim on the financial rewards, which need 
to be settled equitably.
4.  Conclusions
The development of national systems for the governance of REDD requires considerable 
thought.  Very many equity issues arise.  These are not merely, indeed not primarily, 
moral questions.  They are questions of immediate strategic importance. If they are 
not resolved, they are liable to sink the whole REDD boat, since REDD by its nature 
must rely on the good will and cooperation of a large variety of stakeholders.
Communities and local forest users will be prominent among the stakeholders involved 
in REDD, and their situation needs to be taken carefully into consideration when it 
comes to revenue-sharing.  The system devised must be transparent and must have a 
clear legal base with regard to ownership and criteria for payment.  
The biggest danger maybe that the administration of REDD at national level is so 
demanding that it absorbs the greater share of the international payments for carbon, 
leaving little over for incentives and revenue-sharing.  Models for lean, effective, and 
equitable governance systems for REDD are surely needed.
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These forms of management have been shown to be very effective particularly in 
reducing rates of degradation in forest and in allowing forest enhancement through 
natural regeneration.  Indeed they have succeeded in this where most previous 
government efforts had failed. But in addition to this both countries have Conservation 
Areas and Reserves, and may wish to strengthen these (e.g. against encroachment 
and illegal extraction of wood) and expand them under REDD.  In areas which are 
planned for timber extraction, more environmentally friendly methods may be enforced 
such as Reduced Impact Logging.  In areas which are threatened by deforestation 
or degradation through removal of wood for firewood and charcoal, particularly 
around cities, programmes may be devised to bring such harvesting under a more 
sustainable regime, and to reduce the demand by for example by supporting the 
distribution of fuel-saving stoves.  
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ha, the geographic regions with a warmer tropical climate where the net primary 
production rate is higher, will receive more reward. The tCO2/ha criterion may 
not be a suitable yard stick in countries like Nepal and India which have both 
tropical and  slower growing temperate forests, as those stakeholders in areas with 
good conditions stand to gain more for the same level of effort/sacrifice.  Similar 
disparities may relate to population density and the incidence of other social factors 
which may influence the extent to which local forest users are able to control forest 
losses, for example, the threat of external agents illegally using forest. In Nepal for 
example, it is evident that CFM has been able to control degradation in a large part 
of the forest in the mid and hi h hills areas, while it has bee  much less successful in 
the Terai.  The reasons for this are the high timber values in the Terai, and its greater 
accessibility for timber exploitation. Illegal logging by agents from outside the village 
is very common, lbeit with the complicity of some memb rs of the communities. 
This makes it very difficult for CFM to function well.  It r mains a serious challenge 
to design a metric and a reward-distribution system that is equitable and much more 
thought on this issue is required.
(b) The discrepancy between stakeholders who have in the past neglected or over-
exploited the forest and those who have been pursuing sustainable forest management 
for some time; if carbon gains are measured simply as changes in stock over a 
given commitment period, th  later will be penalised.  Countries will have to find 
transparent ways of dealing with this.  Failures of e.g. some communities in Nepal 
to protect their forests may be due to the fact that they are remote and have lacked 
education and support in the p st.
(c) Members of a community may not participate on an equal basis as regards 
efforts to reduce degradation and deforestation, and in this regard sharing of the 
b nefi s may raise equity ssues.  This is ot a n w probl m, and is one that can 
only be dealt with through local organizations such as Van Panchyats and Village 
Forest Committees.  These organizations may not always be perfectly equitable but 
they do have experience in sharing of benefits from community forest management. 
Ideally, an auditing system should be in place whereby payments to communities are 
announced publicly at a specified time each year with all the different measured and 
verified parameters, together with the name of the verifiers and the monetary rewards 
for each group.  A syste  to deal with complaints would be needed, through the 
services of an independent body and in Nepal for example FECOFUN might be 
able to function as an effective watchdog.  
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3.3  How will carbon gains/losses be assessed and checked and by whom (the 
claimants themselves, peers, intermediary bodies, state etc.), how often and 
using what methods?
Modalities of this kind have to be appropriate to local conditions and should therefore 
be selected by the country itself.  However, a country that wishes to participate in the 
international REDD mechanism needs to be able to present verifiable evidence on 
how and by whom, the claimed numbers of REDD units have been achieved, rather 
than presenting this as a black box.  Reports containing such evidence should be 
subject to expert review under the auspices of the UNFCCC.   The methodologies 
and protocols used should be publicly available and ideally based on verifiable 
methods such as those recommended by UNFCCC/IPCC (IPCC, 2003). Consistent 
methodology should be used by different actors and stakeholders within any one 
country.  The aim of the international community should be to provide good practice 
guidance rather than rules and regulations.  
3.4  On what basis will payment be made to the registered carbon stakeholders 
for any carbon gains (e.g. ton carbon basis or area basis, or on some other basis 
such as lump sum payment for implementation of particular forest management 
strategies; in advance, annually, or at the end of the period; using an internal 
market system or an internal fund.)  
This is again a choice which must be left to individual countries to decide; what 
matters most is that the payment system selected has been rigorously discussed with 
all important stakeholders in the forest sector and that all legal aspects have been 
carefully considered before adoption.  Questions may arise concerning stakeholders 
who lose carbon rather than gaining it.  Clearly, such stakeholders will not be 
eligible for carbon payments, but some countries might want to experiment with 
penalties, since the country can only claim the net reductions in emissions, and 
every loss means less overall funding for the areas which have successfully reduced 
emissions.  This raises the more general question concerning how equity issues in the 
distribution of financial benefits will be resolved. Inequitable situations may arise due 
to any or all of the following:  
(a) Different parts of a country may have different natural forest growth rates with 
colder and drier regions characterized by slower growth, and some areas will be 
naturally more subject to wild fires than others.  If payments are based on tCO2/
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3.  Important questions to be resolved as regards governance
3.1  What measures can be taken to ensure that forest dwellers’ and forest 
users’ rights and customs will be respected under REDD, and that their efforts are 
recognized and/or rewarded at the national level for positive carbon impacts?
The issue here is that many people who are dependent on the forest and whose 
activities could be considered a form of management of forest resources, do not 
have legal tenure or rights.  If there are opportunities to earn income from carbon, it 
is probable that disputes over ownership will arise unless the situation is clarified in 
advance.  This may affect even communities who are already practicing community 
forest management in a formal arrangement with the government, as in Nepal and 
India under Community Forest Management (CFM), Joint Forest Management (JFM) 
and as Van Panchyat (VP).  Governments planning to participate in REDD need 
therefore to specify ownership rights as regards carbon, and should formally assign 
these rights to communities wherever this is appropriate.  Although it is not within 
the mandate of the international community to interfere in such decisions at national 
level, countries should be required to report on the process by which ownership of 
carbon has been assigned, with special reference to local communities as users. The 
underlying principle that should be accepted is that “all forest area that will claim 
carbon benefits must have clearly defined property rights that have been accepted 
by the local communities, verified by local institutions and legally recognized by 
the government”. Areas subject to land tenure disputes should not be included in a 
national REDD programme until such disputes are resolved, and when reporting on 
REDD, the country must transparently report on the payment system it has employed 
to compensate the REDD actors for efforts that have led to emission reductions.
With respect to this principle, it may be noted that the ownership rights of CFUG 
members in Nepal to other-forest products have recently been in dispute.  The 
Cabinet Decision of May 2000 imposed a 40% tax on forest products sold outside 
the user group members. This government decision was challenged by Federation of 
Community Forest Users Nepal (FECOFUN), the umbrella organisation for CFUGs, 
and was in the end overturned by the Supreme Court of Nepal in early 2003, which 
found inadequate legal grounds for the government’s taxation claim. The case alerts 
us to the fact that conflict may easily arise over the ownership and share of carbon 
benefits unless the rules are explicitly laid down in law. The government’s objective 
in promoting CFM has up till now been to increase the stock of forest capital.  This 
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has been achieved, but the rules for the sharing of the profits, especially if carbon 
achieves a market value, present second generation challenges which need to be 
resolved.
Within the communities too, lack of transparency (and the fact that carbon is a 
‘virtual’ product, not visible to members in the way that e.g. timber is) may be 
expected to lead to conflicts.  Additional mechanisms and regulations or even new 
institutions to monitor and regulate carbon trading in the forestry sector may be 
necessary, starting at village level with explicit inclusion of carbon benefits in the 
forest management constitutions and operational plans, but also creating formal 
conflict resolution institutions at national level to deal with cases as they arise.  
3.2 What type of national institutional infrastructure is required to successfully 
administer and govern REDD at national level? Which actors will be eligible for 
registration as official REDD partners?  
Clearly, an administrative system of some complexity will be required in most 
countries.  It will need to identify potential contributors to REDD, which may include 
private, community and government agencies, and encourage them to apply for 
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registration; to select, on clear and transparent grounds, those that are eligible and 
those that are not; to reach agreements on the nature of rewards to be given to 
different participants on the basis of clear and transparent criteria; to maintain a 
database of the activities which the different participants are pursing; to monitor their 
progress; to make the pay-outs according to the achievements of participants, and 
to report regularly on all these activities.  Even if some of these tasks are farmed out 
to private sector enterprises, as may well be the case, a government administrative 
office is likely to have the final responsibility for this work.  As regards the criteria for 
selection of eligible partners, this is a matter of policy, and may vary from country to 
country.  Some countries will opt for widespread and direct distribution of rewards 
to stakeholders of all types, others may go for a more centralized approach in 
which certain agencies, such as the forest department, take the largest share of the 
funds and the responsibility for generating carbon savings indirectly.  In this latter 
case particularly, it is clear that accountability of participants is a major challenge. 
While in principle payments for carbon credits will only be paid ex-post, in practice 
it is evident that at least some up-front payments will have to be made if REDD is 
ever to get started.  Naturally, there needs to be attention to the risks of fraud and 
corruption, as in any system which involves the distribution of financial rewards. 
Existence of effective watch-dog organizations will be essential.  A further challenge 
will be to accomplish all this work efficiently and at minimum cost, since the lower 
the overheads, the greater will be the share of the financial reward available for 
distribution as incentives to participants.  For this reason, existing institutional and 
administrative capacity should be used as far as possible and upgraded, rather than 
starting totally new organizations for REDD.  
In setting up such a system, FECOFUN, which is now the largest civil society 
organization in Nepal, could perhaps function as the clearinghouse for CFUG 
registration and claims for carbon rewards, as it already advocates for community 
forestry user group rights at local and national level.  It could be given the responsibility 
for registering and vetting all CFUG claims as regards carbon, for example.  Naturally 
there would have to be independent checks and balances, as FECOFUN is itself 
an interest group and partisan in this respect, but the presence of such institutions 
definitely increases the potential for the participation of communities in REDD. By 
contrary in India, as the laws governing village forests differ between states, an 
equivalent of Nepal’s FECOFUN is not found which operates at the national level.   
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